University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Population Center Working Papers (PSC/PARC)

Penn Population Studies Centers

6-10-2022

Change in Subjective Well-Being, Affluence and Trust in State
Governments in India
Vani S. Kulkarni
University of Pennsylvania, vanik@sas.upenn.edu

Veena S. Kulkarni
Arkansas State University - Main Campus, vkulkarni@astate.edu

Katsushi Imai
University of Manchester, Katsushi.Imai@manchester.ac.uk

Raghav Gaiha
University of Pennsylvania, raghavdasgaiha@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/psc_publications
Part of the Civic and Community Engagement Commons, Demography, Population, and Ecology
Commons, Econometrics Commons, Family, Life Course, and Society Commons, and the Politics and
Social Change Commons

Recommended Citation (OVERRIDE)
Kulkarni, Vani, Veena Kulkarni, Katsushi Imai, and Raghav Gaiha. 2022. "Change in Subjective Well-Being,
Affluence and Trust in State Governments in India." University of Pennsylvania Population Center Working
Paper (PSC/PARC), 2022-94. https://repository.upenn.edu/psc_publications/94.

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/psc_publications/94
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Change in Subjective Well-Being, Affluence and Trust in State Governments in
India
Abstract
The present study explores the relationship between trust in state governments and changes in subjective
well-being in India, drawing upon the nationally-representative India Human Development Survey (IHDS)
panel data for 2005 and 2012. Our econometric results confirm that people’s trust in state governments is
positively associated with changes in their subjective well-being in economic aspects. To take into
account the endogeneity of people’s trust in the state government, we have used the 2SLS model where
the trust is instrumented by (i) whether the winning legislators belonged to the ruling party, and (ii)
whether the margin of victory over the closest rival exceeded 12 %. The robustness of the results has
been confirmed by the Lewbel IV model in which the internal instruments are used in addition to the two
external instruments. The policy focus in rebuilding trust in state governments destroyed by the relentless
pursuit of Hindutva and over-centralisation are discussed.

Keywords
subjective well-being, trust, state governments, federalism, secularism, India

Disciplines
Civic and Community Engagement | Demography, Population, and Ecology | Econometrics | Family, Life
Course, and Society | Politics and Social Change | Social and Behavioral Sciences

This working paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/psc_publications/94

10 June, 2022

Change in Subjective Well-Being, Affluence and Trust in State
Governments in India1
Vani S. Kulkarni, Department of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania,
vaniskulkarni2001@gmail.com
Veena S. Kulkarni, Department of Criminology, Sociology, and Geography, Arkansas
State University, vkulkarni@astate.edu
Katsushi S. Imai, Department of Economics, The University of Manchester,
Katsushi.Imai@manchester.ac.uk
&

Raghav Gaiha, Population Aging Research Centre, University of Pennsylvania,
raghavdasgaiha@gmail.com

Abstract
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Change in Subjective Well-Being, Affluence and Trust in State
Governments in India
1. Introduction
Measurement of well-being remains controversial. Specifically, there has been serious
questioning of measures of well-being, based on per capita income/expenditure. This has led
to alternative measures of well-being. Of particular importance are measures of subjective
well-being during the last few decades. Among those who have given strong conceptual and
empirical support, some prominent contributions include Clark (2003), Blanchflower and
Oswald (2004, 2007), Easterlin (1973, 2006), Kahneman and Krueger (2006), Kahneman and
Deaton (2010), Diener et al., (2013), Akay et al., (2017), and Deaton (2011& 2018).
Subjective well-being (SWB) or life evaluation refers to the quality or goodness of lives,
overall life satisfaction, or sometimes happiness. Measurement is usually based on the Cantril
ladder (1965), wherein individuals are asked to place themselves on an 11-step ladder with
the worst possible life representing the lowest rung and the best possible life representing the
top rung.
The measurement of SWB, however, has its own critics. Ravallion et al. (2016), for example,
are sceptical but not dismissive of such measures. Their scepticism rests on scale
heterogeneity - the standard deviation of utility over different choice situations. Yet
subjective measures of poverty are not just similar to those obtained from income/expenditure
thresholds but sometimes unavoidable2. Deaton (2018), for example, offers robust support to
self-reported measures of well-being, as such measures capture aspects of welfare beyond
real income, which is what economists typically use to proxy utility. He uses cross-country
and country-specific comparisons to validate measures of SWB and draws out their policy
significance.
Here we aim to build on our recent companion study (Kulkarni et al., 2022a) that has
analysed the relationship between change in subjective well-being, affluence and trust in
politicians. A significant contribution of the present study is the examination of the
relationship between change in subjective well-being, ∆SWB, and trust in state governments
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another contribution, Ravallion (2014) conjectures that different people are likely to have different ideas
about what it means to be “rich” or “poor,” or “satisfied” or not with one’s life, leading them to interpret survey
questions on subjective welfare differently.
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in India. To the best of our knowledge, not only analytical studies of SWB at the all-India
level are scanty but also there is none that explores the relationship between SWB and trust in
state governments.
The Indian governmental structure is quasi-federal, with a strong central government at the
national level (which is a unitary feature) as well as three tiers of government at the national,
state, and local levels (which is a federal feature). The state governments have exclusive
power to make laws on the provisions mentioned in the state list (except in case of a national
emergency in which the national government becomes excessively powerful). Besides, the
state governments act as primary sub-national governments and are responsible for making
laws in a variety of areas such as public health, sanitation, agriculture, and the police, among
others, which affect the day-to-day life of the individual. The respective level of public trust
in government can play a pivotal role in influencing the power equations between the
governments at national and sub-national levels, because those with greater trust in the state
government are more likely to support an increased role of the state government in policymaking rather than the national government (Kumar et al. 2020).
Here we examine who trusts the state government and why and whether this trust contributes
to change in well-being. Besides, we experiment with IV estimations of trust in state
governments -including 2SLS and IV Lewbel estimations - to address the endogeneity
concerns and robustness of the results. Through these estimations, we aim to identify causal
relationships between changes in subjective well-being and trust in state governments.
2. Scheme
In section 3, we review selectively the literature on subjective well-being and its covariates,
followed by a few studies of trust in state governments/or governments in general. Section 4
discusses salient features of the main data source, the India Human Development Survey,
conducted by the University of Maryland and the National Council of Applied Economic
Research. It is a unique all-India panel survey that covers 2005 and 2012. This is followed by
a discussion of descriptive statistics, and an examination of whether trust breeds trust over
time. Section 5 discusses the model specifications used for the econometric analysis. This is
followed by an interpretation of the results based on the 2SLS and Lewbel models. These
results are discussed from a broad policy perspective in Section 6. Concluding observations
draw attention to the constraints in designing and implementing policy reforms under the
present regime NDA led by the BJP in Section 7.
3

3. Literature Review
As a detailed literature review of subjective well-being (SWB) is already available in
Kulkarni et al. (2021, 2022 a), a selective review is given below to reduce the overlap.
(i)

Studies of Subjective Well-Being (SWB)3

One important empirical issue is whether the measures of SWB are reliable (e.g., Kahneman
and Krueger, 2006; Kahneman and Deaton, 2010; Diener et al., 2013; Akay et al., 2017, and
Deaton, 2011, 2018). Kahneman and Krueger (2006) argue that one way of partially
assessing the validity of SWB measures is to examine their correlations with various
individual traits. They argue that (i) recent positive changes in circumstances, as well as
demographic variables including education and health, are likely to be positively correlated
with happiness or satisfaction; (ii) variables that are associated with low life satisfaction and
happiness include: recent negative changes of circumstances; chronic pain; and
unemployment, especially if only the individual concerned was laid off; (iii) gender is
uncorrelated with life satisfaction and happiness; (iv) the effects of age are complex - the
lowest life satisfaction is apparently experienced by those who have teenagers at home, and
reported satisfaction improves thereafter. They resolve the puzzle of the relatively small and
short-lived effect of changes in most life circumstances on reported life satisfaction by
invoking evidence on adaptability. They conclude that despite their limitations, subjective
measures of well-being enable welfare analysis in a more direct way that could be a preferred
alternative to traditional welfare analysis.
Another important study by Diener et al. (2013) scrutinises the life satisfaction scales in the
global context, based on their critical review of relevant studies and verification of the
reliability of the scales used and validity of judgments made in SWB measures. They find
that the stability of life satisfaction scores across time and situations suggests that consistent
psychological processes are involved and similar information is used when people report their
scores, while single-item scales are less stable than multi-item life satisfaction scales.
Societal-level mean life satisfaction also shows robust consistency. In brief, the reliability and
the validity of life satisfaction scales reflect authentic differences in the ways people evaluate
their lives, and the scores move in expected ways to changes in people’s circumstances.

3

This sub-section draws upon Kulkarni et al. (2021, 2022a) to show the importance of SWB as a welfare metric.
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Deaton (2018) is a strong proponent of SWB measures. He argues that SWB measures do not
need to be related to behaviour. ‘If decision utility differs from welfare utility, and if people
sometimes behave against their best interests, the direct measurement of well-being might
still give an accurate measure, and might even enable people to do better, either through
paternalistic government policies, or incentives, but more simply by providing information on
the circumstances and choices that promote well-being …’ (ibid., 2018, p. 18). He elaborates
that direct measures may also capture aspects of welfare beyond real income, which is what
economists typically use to proxy utility. Health is a case in point; education, civil liberties,
civic participation, respect, dignity, and freedom are others.
Deaton (2018), based on the Gallup World Poll, uses an evaluative measure of well-being
that asks people to report, on an eleven-point scale, from 0 to 10, how their life is going
(originally due to Cantril, 1965). His main findings are: average ladder values vary greatly
around the world, from around 4 in Africa, to between 7 and 8 in the rich countries of Europe
and the English-speaking world; differences between men and women within regions are
smaller than differences between regions; women tend to evaluate their lives somewhat more
highly than men, except in Africa, and sometimes among those over 60; age patterns are
apparent, but neither universal, nor very pronounced, at least compared with those associated
with international differences in incomes; the (unconditional) U-shape appears in the English
speaking countries (U.K., U.S., Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and Australia), to a lesser
extent in East and in South Asia and perhaps in Latin America and the Caribbean - though
only in the last age group (65-74), and in Europe—more for men than women—but not
elsewhere. In the two poorest regions, Africa and South Asia, life evaluation is low
throughout life and, in Africa, it falls with age. However, Deaton is puzzled by the U-shape
of well-being, where it exists, since SWB rises after middle age, when people are losing their
spouses, and when both morbidity and mortality are rising. In contrast, other components of
psychological well-being may improve with age, less stress, and the negative side-effects
(e.g., physical pain) of work diminish with retirement.
In an admirably clear and comprehensive review of factors associated with SWB, Dolan et al.
(2008) draw attention to ambiguities, inconsistencies and causality in the interpretation of the
results. The results generally show positive but diminishing returns to income. Some of this
positive association is likely to be due to reverse causation, as indicated by the studies which
show higher well-being leading to higher future incomes (Clark, Frijters, and Shields, 2008).
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Broadening the scope of the extant literature, we review a small selection of studies that
examine the relationship between SWB and trust in public institutions. Before reviewing
these studies, something must be said on trust as an analytical category.
Trust is a relational concept that links the subject (who trusts) to the object (that is trusted).
Trust is conditional on an object between two individuals, A and B. Trust is thus expressed
as A trusts B to do X (Hardin, 2000)4. Fehr (2009) argued that trust should be defined in
relation with people’s behavioural and social preferences and beliefs and found that the
survey-based measure of trust is correlated with low levels in betrayal aversion and in risk
aversion. Given that preferences are exogenous and beliefs are endogenous in the short run,
trust is partly exogenous and partly endogenous, which led the author to argue that how trust
was endogenously formed should be taken into account in the empirical analysis.
(ii)

SWB and Trust in Public Institutions

The only comprehensive study of the causal relationship between subjective well-being
(more specifically, change in subjective economic well-being) and trust in politicians is
Kulkarni et al. (2022a)5.

Besides, some key causal relationships between ∆SWB and

demographic and socio-economic variables are highlighted. To illustrate, higher political trust
causes a perceived change in well-being to rise. However, higher criminality among MPs
reaches a threshold at which trust begins to decline. Yet another important insight is
corroboration of the contributory role of schooling to perceived well-being. Age is
significantly and positively related with ∆SWB. A related finding is that the significant
contribution of schooling rises with the number of years of schooling. Relative to rural
residents, while urban residents continue to experience higher perceived well-being, its
erosion in the near future is not unlikely. Although the caste hierarchy is intact, the results are
mixed. Relative to OBCs, SCs are better-off while Others (akin to upper castes) are worse
off6. Relative to Hindus, as expected, Muslims are not significantly better off while other

Addition of time to Hardin’s definition indicates that trust may change over time — “A trusts B to do X at T”
(Bauer and Freitag, 2017).
4
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Note that trust in politicians and governments are both components of political trust.
Based on OLS, Fontaine and Yamada (2014) report two important findings. (i) caste does not impact directly
but indirectly through another channel. Individuals are often implicitly assumed to compare themselves to their
peers. Strong tensions are known to exist between castes. Indians do not compare only to their caste fellows:
they also compare to members of the other castes. However, it is only between-caste comparisons that have a
strong and negative impact on well-being; (ii) this comparison scheme is asymmetrical. Only low castes are
affected by the economic successes of their rivals, whereas only higher-caste Indians compete with their fellows.
6
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religious minorities such as Christians and Others (including Jains, Sikhs and Buddhists)
experience higher perceived well-being. So religious harmony makes a significant difference
to ∆SWB but not as much as expected. Individual household affluence has a significant effect
on perceived well-being. This is hardly surprising as our measure is narrowly focused on a
perceived change in well-being in economic aspects. Essentially, greater affluence allows a
household to do this or that-more specifically, it could engage in leisurely pursuits, ensure
better quality schooling for the children and healthcare for household members. However,
greater affluence at the state level (measured in per capita net state domestic product per
capita) causes a decline in ∆ 𝑆𝑊𝐵. It is conjectured that the states with low GDPs target
public support to the deprived better, and thus show higher ∆SWB. A case in point is Kerala7.
(iii)

Trust in Government and Democracy

Whether people perceive policies and decisions of the government as legitimate or not
depends on whether or not they believe the processes used for implementing them are fair
and impartial (Erlingsson et al., 2014). Another criterion popular with citizens is the
‘effectiveness’ of the government. Indeed, effectiveness is identified as the ‘instrumental’
criterion which people can use for judging the government. Cheema (2010) argues that
citizens are more likely to trust political institutions, government officials, and politicians
when the government is perceived as effective and democratic. Muller and Jukam (1977)
observe that perception of the government as ineffective results in a lack of confidence in the
government.
Several studies observe that an increase in public trust is a means to realising good
governance and to achieving better results in terms of reducing administrative costs and
increasing the general public’s compliance with rules and regulations (Levi, 1997). The
accountability of the government is also a key factor influencing public trust in government

The fact that comparisons between rival castes are made by low-caste Indians bears out Duesenberry’s view
(1949) that individuals at the bottom of the hierarchy compare themselves to those at the top but that the reverse
does not hold.
7

Another recent study of trust in state governments, based on the IHDS, is by Kumar et al. (2020). Using a logit
model, the authors examine how the level of household confidence in the state government changes with
households’ socio-economic status, personal experiences, and benefits received from government programmes
and direct social benefit schemes. However, the findings cannot be taken at face value as several explanatory
variables are endogenous (eg, life insurance, health insurance, crop insurance, Kisaan credit cards, Indira Awas
Yojana). Worse, both dependent and explanatory variables relate to 2011/12. Hence the results are vulnerable to
reverse causality/association.
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(Cheema, 2010). According to Brillantes and Fernandez (2011), a responsive government can
play a key role in restoring trust in the government.
Dalton (2005) offers a detailed analysis of how tax compliance varies with the level of
political trust. When citizens believe the government is acting for the common good,
decisions will be perceived as legitimate and citizens will accept these decisions, and they
will be more willing to comply with them on a voluntary basis. Citizens will pay taxes and
obey laws because they are members of a community and they consider this as the ‘proper’
thing to do within a political community. Conversely, when citizens distrust such action of
government, their willingness to obey government decisions is limited and, in particular,
citizens are less willing to pay taxes. Given the importance of taxes for the functioning of any
government, a general lack of trust is therefore likely to destabilise the system.
In a more nuanced econometric analysis, Marien and Hooghe (2011) test the hypothesis: are
citizens with lower levels of trust in political institutions less willing to obey the law? The
analysis is based on European Values Survey (EVS 1999-2000). A multilevel ordered
regression model is used in which the dependent variable is not whether the respondent has
actually done something illegal, but rather whether the respondent condones these actions
(legal permissiveness). The key explanatory variable is political trust and other covariates
include age, education, religion, gender, and moral orientation. Respondents with higher
levels of political trust are less likely to have permissive attitudes than respondents with
lower levels of political trust in various specifications. In other words, those who do not
express trust in political institutions have a more permissive attitude toward lawbreaking
behaviour than those with higher trust levels.
It is further contended that political trust also impacts the capability of government systems to
fulfil their basic tasks towards the population. This would imply that low levels of political
trust can pose a challenge for the governability of contemporary liberal societies. Indeed, in
the worst-case scenario, a vicious cycle emerges for governments and political trust without
necessarily insisting that democracy will be at risk.
4. Data and Descriptive Analysis
(a) Data
Our analysis draws upon the two rounds of the nationally-representative India Human
Development Survey (IHDS) data for 2005 and 2012, collected jointly by the University of
8

Maryland and the National Council of Applied Economic Research, New Delhi. The first
round (IHDS-1) is a survey of 41,554 households in 2004-5. The second round (IHDS-II)
involves re-interviews with 83% of the original households as well as split households
residing within the same locality, along with an additional sample of 2,134 households in
20128. The total for IHDS-II is therefore 42,152 households. The sample is spread across 33
(now 34) states and union territories, and covers rural as well as urban areas. Repeated
interviewing of the same households at two points in time facilitates a richer understanding of
which households are able to partake in the fruits of growth, what allows them to move
forward, and the process through which they are incorporated into or left out of a growing
economy.
Topics covered by the IHDS relevant in the present context include perceived changes in
subjective well-being (SWB) in economic aspects, expenditure, income, employment, health
insurance, castes, religion, assets, trust in institutions, and demographic characteristics (e.g.
gender, age, marital status)9.
An important feature of IHDS is that it collected data on SWB changes. The question asked
is: “Compared to 7 years ago, would you say your household is economically doing the same,
better or worse today?”. So the focus of this SWB is narrow and it has only three scales
corresponding to the perceived change in it (denoted as ∆SWB hereafter), not its level. It
should also be noted that the measure is at the household level, not the individual level. While
the focus of this variable is narrow, it has a few advantages. First, as reviewed in detail in the
previous section, there exists a life-cycle effect on SWB, that is, perceived well-being
changes at the point of the life-cycle or age of the respondent as well as his/her spouse or
other household members. While the survey question asks about the change in SWB
compared to that 7 years ago, it can be different from the time-series comparison of the level
8An

additional sample of 2134 households was added to the urban sample of IHDS-II to reduce the impact
of attrition on the standard errors of a few key variables. The simulations estimated that the attrition would
increase standard errors to unacceptable levels if 8 out of 15 households were unreachable in each urban
cluster. Hence, the interviewers were asked to report to NCAER supervisors if they were unable to
recontact 5 or more households in a cluster. The supervisor verified the losses and randomly assigned
households to the right, the left, or at the original location based on the original locations of the households
which were not observed in 2012 using a predefined rule. A similar addition to the rural sample was not
attempted because of much lower attrition rates (Personal communication with Sonalde Desai who led
both rounds of IHDS).
9It is noted that IHDS-1 in 2005 does not allow identification of the respondent, while IHDS-II in 2012
does. As the respondents reported SWB changes between 2005 and 2012 at the household level in IHDSII, we have matched SWB changes, a dependent variable, to household head’s characteristics, and other
explanatory variables, by restricting the sample only to the case where the household head served as a
respondent.
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in SWB because of the stronger effect of more recent experiences of negative shocks (e.g.,
death of a breadwinner) on SWB. In this sense, our proxy is likely to be more closely
associated with SWB at the time of the survey (2012) rather than 7 years ago (2004-05),
although given that this is a longitudinal survey, the individuals are expected to retain some
memories of the last survey as a reference point. Second, by asking specifically about
economic well-being, the respondents will perceive the same aspect in well-being. This will
minimise the heterogeneity in the respondent’s perceptions or focus on well-being compared
with the variable based on more general questions about happiness or ‘the best possible life’.
Third, while most of the earlier studies asked about the individual SWB, our measure
captures ∆SWB at the household level. Since the life-cycle effect is somewhat diluted, this
has the advantage that it allows analysis of the household-level covariates of ∆SWB.
Detailed expenditure data are collected based on 52 questions about household expenditure.
The location of households is classified into rural, urban (net of slums) and slums. Five caste
categories are considered: Brahmins, High Castes, Other Backward Classes (OBCs),
Scheduled Castes (SCs/Dalits), Scheduled Tribes (STs/Adivasis) and a residual “Other”
category.
Marital status is disaggregated into unmarried, married, and widowed/separated.
IHDS obtains labour force participation data as part of its detailed income questions. Work
participation includes farm, business, and wages/salary. Within each income section, IHDS
asks who in the household participated in this activity and what their level of participation
was. Detailed demographic data are collected including gender, age, schooling and marital
status. At the household level, the highest schooling attainment of adult women and adult
men are taken from individual education records. Adults are defined as individuals 21 years
or older. Based on the number of years of schooling, individuals are classified into illiterates,
those with primary schooling, middle-level schooling, matriculates and graduates.
Net state domestic product (NSDP) per capita at constant prices is obtained from state
economic surveys. We use its log transformation as an explanatory variable.
A unique feature of IHDS is that it asks a question on trust in public institutions such as state
government, judiciary, police and politicians. Trust is measured in ordinal levels of
confidence: a great deal of confidence, only some confidence and hardly any confidence. We
create an indicator variable on whether a head of the household trusted in the state
10

government or not by bundling the first two categories (=1) to be contrasted with the last
category (=0). Our focus here is thus confined to the relationship between the household
head’s perceived change in SWB in the economic aspect (∆SWB) and trust in the state
government. In order to instrument trust in state governments, we use two variables: MLAs’
margin of victory relative to the closest rival; and the proportion of MLAs that belonged to
the party which ruled in the state. The data are taken from Association of Democratic Reform
(ADR) which provides data on MLAs, their party affiliations and margin of victory.
(b) Descriptive Analysis
A broad-brush treatment of changes in SWB is given below.
In 2012 relative to 2005, 9.71% of the respondents expressed that they were worse- off,
50.34% reported that they were just the same, and 39.95% were better- off. Hence the people
who felt just the same made up the highest share.
The sample was disaggregated into five age groups: 15–30 years, 31–50 years, 51–60 years,
61–70 years, and >70 years. Three striking features are that in all the age groups, the
proportion of individuals who felt that their position was just the same was highest and varied
little; the proportion of the better-off group was well below that of just the same group, but
there was a decline across age groups and the proportion of worse off group was low but rose
among older people.
In rural areas, the highest proportion is of those who report that their well-being is just the
same (about 55 %) while that of the better-off is much lower (well under 35 %). In sharp
contrast, in urban areas, the highest proportion is of the better-off. Urban slums, however, are
similar to rural areas, as the proportions of just the same are highest and of the same
magnitude, and that of the better-off is slightly higher in the former.
Barely about 11 % of the households report a great deal of trust in the politicians, about 34 %
show only some trust, and a majority (over 56 %) report hardly any trust.
Cross-tabulations of trust in state governments in 2005 by trust in state governments in 2012
yield interesting insights.
At the all-India level, the share of those with a great deal of confidence in state governments
rose from over 27.50 % in 2005 to just under 31 % in 2012; of those with some confidence
fell from over 51 % to about 49 %; and of those with hardly any confidence decreased from
11

over 21 % to about 20 %. Thus the changes were small except that the share of those with a
great deal of confidence rose.
Disaggregation by religion brings out interesting contrasts. Among Hindus, the share of those
with a great deal of confidence in state governments rose from over 28 % in 2005 to well
over 31 % in 2012; of those with only some confidence fell from well over 51 % to about 49
%; and among those with hardly any confidence decreased slightly from 20.60 % to 19.75 %.
Hence the changes in trust were small except that the share of those with a great deal of
confidence rose. Among Muslims, the share of those with a great deal of confidence rose
from well over 23 % to about 30%-a sharper rise compared with Hindus; the share of those
with only some confidence fell from well under 53 % to under 48 %; and of those with
hardly any confidence remained almost unchanged at about 23 %. That Muslims experienced
a larger increase in the share of those with a great deal of confidence despite being a minority
and often a victim of discrimination is indeed surprising, and reinforces the secularist
credentials of the UPA. Among “Others”-which lumps together Christians, Sikhs and
Buddhists-there is hardly any change in the share of those with a great deal of confidence
(under 29 % in both years); in contrast, however, the share of those with only some
confidence rose from well under 48 % to about 51.50 %; however, the share of those with
hardly any confidence decreased from 24.50 % to well under 23 %.
Salience of the caste hierarchy has remained intact despite inter-caste marriages and upward
income mobility of the lower rungs (eg, SCs). Among Brahmins at the top of the hierarchy,
the share of those with a great deal of confidence increased from about 26.50 % to about
28.50 %; of those with only some confidence fell from 49 % to 48 %; and of those with
hardly any confidence decreased from 25.50% to well under 23 %. A different pattern is
found among High Castes. The share of those with a great deal of confidence fell slightlyfrom well over 27 % to a little over 26 %; of those with only some confidence remained
almost unchanged at about 51 %; however, the share of those with hardly any confidence
rose moderately-from about 21.50 % to over 23 %. Among OBCs, the share of those with a
great deal of confidence increased from over 29 % to well over 31 %; of those with only
some confidence remained unchanged at about 49.50 %; and of those with hardly any
confidence also remained almost unchanged at about 20 %. Dalits belong to the lower rung of
the caste hierarchy. The share of those with a great deal of confidence rose from under 27.50
% to 33.50 %; of those with only some confidence decreased from over 52 % to under 49 %,
as also of those with hardly any confidence from under 20.50 % to just under 18 %. That they
12

benefited from the quotas in schooling and public employment is part of the explanation. A
slightly different pattern emerges for Adivasis-the lowest rung and the most isolated spatially.
The share of those with a great deal of confidence rose from under 30.50 % to 33.50 %; of
those with some confidence, however, decreased from 53.50 % to over 46 %; of those with
hardly any confidence rose from over16 % to well over 20%. In the residual group of
“Others” , likened to upper castes, the share of those with a great deal of confidence rose
sharply from 22.50 % to well over 30 %; while of those with only some confidence fell from
under 53 % to about 48.50 %; as also of those with hardly any confidence from under 25 % to
under 21.50 %.
The last set of cross-tabulations examine the associations between trust in state governments
and per capita expenditure terciles. In the first and lowest tercile (or the bottom 33 %) of
households, the share of those with a great deal of confidence increased from over 28 % to
over 35 %; while of those with only some confidence decreased from under 52 % to well
under 47 %; as also of those with hardly any confidence from over 20 % to over 18 %. In the
second tercile/middle expenditure group, a slightly different pattern is observed. The share of
those with a great deal of confidence increased from under 28.50 % to over 29.30 %;
however, of those with only some confidence decreased from under 54 % to 50.50 %; but of
those with hardly any confidence remained almost unchanged at about 20 %. In the third
tercile/or relatively affluent, the share of those with a great deal of confidence remained
almost unchanged at about 28.50 %; of those with only some confidence, however, increased
slightly from well under 49 % to about 50 %; but of those with hardly any confidence
decreased slightly from 23% to under 21.50 %.
We address a related issue: does trust in state government breed trust over time? In order to
do so, we throw light on fractions from each trust category in 2005 that remained or moved
up into the category of a great deal of confidence in 2012 and the fractions that descended
into hardly any trust.
At the aggregate level, we find that just under 32.50 % of those with a great deal of
confidence in 2005 remained in the same category in 2012 while over 19.50 % descended
into the category of hardly any confidence. Among those with only some confidence, under
30.50 % moved up into a great deal of confidence while under 20 % descended into hardly
any confidence. What is perhaps most striking is that, even among those with hardly any
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confidence, just under 30.50 % recorded a great deal of confidence while under 21.50 %
remained in the same category.
A disaggregated analysis by religion throws up interesting contrasts. Among Hindus, the
share of those with a great deal of confidence who retained it was just under 32.50 % while
that of those who descended into hardly any confidence was about 19 %. Among those with
only some confidence, 30.50 % moved up into the category of a great deal of confidence
while well under 20 % descended into hardly any confidence. Among those with hardly any
confidence, it is indeed striking that over 31 % moved up into a great deal of confidence
while about 21 % descended into hardly any confidence. There is some variation in the
pattern among Muslims. Under 32.50 % of those with a great deal of confidence in 2005
retained it in 2012 while under 22.50 % descended into hardly any confidence. Among those
who had only some confidence under 30.50 % moved up into a great deal of confidence
while well under 23 % descended into the category of hardly any confidence. Among those
with only some confidence under 30.50 % moved up to a great deal of confidence while well
under 21 % descended into hardly any confidence. Just under 27 % of those with hardly any
confidence moved up into a great deal of confidence while a little over 19 % remained in the
same category. Among “Others”, the share of those with a great deal of confidence who
retained it was just under 30.50 % and of those who descended into hardly any confidence
was under 22 %. Among those with only some confidence, the share of those who moved up
into a great deal of confidence was just under 28 % while of those who descended into hardly
any confidence was under 19.50 %. Among those with hardly any confidence, the share of
those moving up into a great deal of confidence was well under 28 % while of those who
remained in the same category was over 19 %.
Among Brahmins, the share of those with a great deal of confidence who retained it was
under 27 % while of those who descended into hardly any confidence was well over 18 %.
Within those with only some confidence the share of those who moved up into a great deal of
confidence was over 27 % while of those who descended into hardly any confidence was well
over 23 %. Among those with hardly any confidence, the share of those who moved up into a
great deal of confidence was well over 33 % while of those who remained in the same
category was well over 26 %. Among High Castes, the share of those with a great deal of
confidence who retained it was under 29 % while of those who descended into hardly any
confidence was under 21.50 %. Among those with only some confidence the share of those
who moved up into a great deal of confidence was well under 26 % while of those who
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descended into hardly any confidence was under 24 %.Within those who had hardly any
confidence the share of those who moved up into a great deal of confidence was under 23.50
% while of those who remained in the same category was under 23.50 %. This is the first case
in which both shares were equal.
Under OBCs, out of those with a great deal of confidence the share of those who retained it
was under 34 % while of those with hardly any confidence was well under 19 %. Among
those with only some confidence the share of those who moved up into a great deal of
confidence was over 29 % while of those with hardly any confidence was a little over 19 %.
Among those with hardly any confidence the share of those who moved up into a great deal
of confidence was 33 % and of those who remained in the same category was under 20.50 %.
At the lower rung are Dalits. Among them the share of those who retained a great deal of
confidence was well over 32 % while of those who descended into hardly any confidence was
well under 22 %. Among those with only some confidence the share of those who moved up
into a great deal of confidence was over 35 % while of those with hardly any confidence was
over 16.50 %. Among those with hardly any confidence, the share of those who moved up
into a great deal of confidence was nearly 31% and of those who remained within the same
category was a little over 20 %.
At the lowest rung are Adivasis. Among them, the share of those who retained a great deal of
confidence was under 35 % while of those with hardly any confidence was well under 22 %.
Among those with only some confidence, the share of those who moved up into a great deal
of confidence was just under 33 % and of those who descended into hardly any confidence
was under 20 %. Among those with hardly any confidence, the share of those who moved up
into a great deal of confidence was under 34 % while of those who remained within the same
category was just under 19 %.
In the residual caste group, “Others”, the share of those who retained a great deal of trust was
under 32.50 % while of those with hardly any confidence was under 21.50 %. Among those
with only some confidence the share of those who moved up into a great deal of confidence
was just under 30.50%. Among those with hardly any confidence, the share of those who
moved up into a great deal of confidence was 29 % while of those who descended into hardly
any confidence was under 23 %. Among those with hardly any confidence the share of those
who moved up into a great deal of confidence was 28 % while of those who remained in the
same category was just under 23 %.
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Turning to an economic indicator, per capita expenditure tercile, we find that in the first
tercile the share of those who retained a great deal of confidence was just under 35.50 %
while of those with hardly any confidence was well under 19%. Among those with only some
confidence well under 37 % moved up into a great deal of confidence while over 17 %
descended into hardly any confidence. Among those with hardly any confidence the share of
those who moved up into a great deal of confidence was 31 % while of those who remained
in the same category was over 20 %.
In the second tercile/the middle-income class, the share of those who retained a great deal of
confidence was over 32 % while of those who descended into hardly any confidence was well
over 20 %. Among those with only some confidence the share of those who moved up into a
great deal of confidence was just under 28 % while of those who descended into hardly any
confidence was well under 20 %. Among those with hardly any confidence, the share of those
who moved up into a great deal of confidence was under 30 % while of those who remained
in the same category was under 22 %.
In the third tercile/or relatively affluent, the share of those who retained a great deal of
confidence was under 30 % while of those who descended into hardly any confidence was
just under 20 %. Among those with only some confidence, the share of those who moved up
into a great deal of confidence was over 27 % while of those who descended into hardly any
confidence was over 22 %. Among those with hardly any confidence, the share of those who
moved up into a great deal of confidence was under 30.50 % while of those who remained in
the same category was under 22 %.
To sum up, in almost all cases there was a net gain of confidence (share of those with a great
deal of confidence minus that of who descended into hardly any confidence or remained in
the same category). This suggests that trust in state governments breeds trust over time.
Another significant finding is that across religions, castes and expenditure terciles, the more
deprived recorded larger gains in confidence compared with those less deprived or better-off.
Part of the explanation lies in their greater dependence on social safety nets, and protection
from those belonging to upper castes, dominant religion and hostility of the rich and
powerful.
(c) India’s Federal System
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Economic liberalisation side-lined welfare as it was traditionally practised and heightened
social tension and alienation. At the same time, when the Congress-led United Progressive
Alliance (UPA) introduced a new welfare regime, it was quite different from the earlier
model in that it built on shifting understandings of the relationship between the state, market,
and its citizens. These included the use of principles of choice in health insurance policies,
and a shift from employer to state responsibility for social security. There has been
substantial variation across states in how they adapted to, and themselves shaped, these shifts
at the local level. Furthermore, states themselves, both before and after 2004, have been
important originators of new social policies, some of which have also been scaled up.
Deshpande et al. (2017) make several important points about the role of state governments in
shaping and implementation of social policies10. It is in the process of implementation at the
local level that policies are themselves shaped and reinvented in important ways. Against this
backdrop, a large proportion of social sector expenditure took place at the state level. For
instance, about 90 percent of total expenditure in health and education occurs at the state
level.
Attention is drawn to a few landmark shifts and reforms during the UPA regime. These
included a major public employment programme for rural households (Mahatma Gandhi
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005), the Social Security for Unorganised
Workers Act, 2008, which included health insurance for informal sector workers (Rashtriya
Swastha Bima Yojana); and the National Food Security Act 2013, which expanded the
coverage and lowered the prices at which subsidised food is available to poor households.
Besides, these programmes imparted a statutory backing to the entitlements or “rights” they
offered (Deshpande et al. 2017).
State governments were at the forefront of the new welfare regime. At the same time, when
the UPA introduced a new welfare regime, it built on evolving understandings of the
relationship between the state, market, and its citizens. Health insurance policies offered
choice, and the shift from employer to state responsibility for social security was significant.
Unsurprisingly, substantial variation was observed across states. Furthermore, states
themselves, both before and after 2004, have been important originators of new social

10

For insightful case studies of states, see Deshpande et al. (2017). Briefly, paired comparisons of two states
(Tamil Nadu-Kerala, and Maharashtra-West Bengal) are carried out to demonstrate the ways in which
subnational political environments shape social policy.
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policies, some of which have also been scaled up to the national policy. An example is
Andhra Pradesh’s Aarogyasri health insurance scheme (Deshpande et al. 2017).
Dramatic changes in governance and fiscal federalism occurred under the NDA. Since 2014,
there has been a shift toward greater political congruence between governments elected at the
state level in India’s federal system and at the centre. A new phase of single-party dominance
began, and with this, the BJP at the centre has pushed ahead relentlessly its One Nation
agenda (Aiyyar and Tillin 2020). More on this later.
5. Methods
(a) Model Specifications
To serve as the basis for more refined models, we begin with a multiple regression model
where the dependent variable, ∆SWB (0, 1, 2), corresponding to ‘worse-off’, ‘just the same’
or ‘better-off’- is estimated by a set of explanatory variables using OLS.11 Because ∆SWB is
the perceived change of economic well-being during the last 7 years, based on the household
head’s perception in 2012, all the explanatory variables are based on the survey questions in
2005 to partially address the issue of reverse causation from ∆SWB to, for instance,
income/expenditure.
A multiple regression model is expressed as:
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖 𝛽2 + 𝜀𝑖

(1)

where 𝑦𝑖 is ∆SWB, the change in subjective well-being in economic aspects between 2005
and 2012 and 𝑖 stands for an individual where the household head was a respondent in 2012
(where 𝑖 takes 1, …., 27,958). 𝛽0 is a constant term. 𝜀𝑖 is an error term assumed to be
independent and identically distributed.
Our main explanatory variable is denoted as 𝑇𝑖 , whether a household head had trust in the
state government. Our main question is whether trust in state governments is associated with

improvement in perceived well-being, tested by examining the sign and the statistical
significance of 𝛽1.

11

See Angrist and Pischke (2008) for a detailed argument in favour of the Linear Probability Model (LPM) over
the probit model where OLS is used for a binary choice model, against the standard textbook recommendation
for the use of probit or logit models for the binary variable. The use of OLS for the discrete variable (0, 1, 2) can
be justified on the same grounds. OLS with robust clustered standard errors is used to address possible
correlations between individuals within a household as well as heteroscedasticity.
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𝑋𝑖 denotes a vector containing a number of other explanatory variables and 𝛽2 is a vector of
coefficients to be estimated. 𝑋𝑖 includes the age of the household head and its squared term,
log per capita expenditure, caste, religion, marital status, gender, location-rural, urban (net of
slums) and slums, schooling years, and state domestic product per capita, all in 2005.
However, the variable on trust in the state government, 𝑇𝑖 , may be endogenous in Equation (1)
because, for instance, the extent to which the individuals trust the state government is likely
influenced by their experience and the resulting perception of their economic circumstances
that can be affected by the state’s policies. It is also argued that an unobserved factor not
captured by 𝑋𝑖 affects both the change in subjective well-being in economic aspects and
people’s trust in state governments. We therefore instrument 𝑇𝑖 by using a 2SLS (two-stage
least squares) estimation. In the first stage, we estimate 𝑇𝑖 by two instruments, 𝑧1𝑖 and 𝑧2𝑖
(Equation (2)) and in the second we estimate Equation (1) based on the estimate of Equation
(2) in the first stage.
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖 𝛽2 + 𝜀1𝑖

(1)’

𝑇𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑧1𝑖 + 𝛼2 𝑧2𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖 𝛼3 + 𝜀2𝑖

(2)

In the main specification based on 2SLS, we use the margin of victory of MLAs (𝑧1𝑖 ) and
whether they belonged to the party that ruled in the state (𝑧2𝑖 ) for 𝑇𝑖 , trust in state
government12. It is hypothesised that the greater the margin of victory in the legislative
assembly election, the more likely it is that the elected MLA will act in ways that will not
necessarily serve the interests of the electorate better. Overconfidence breeds arrogance and
neglect of weaker sections. Besides, if an MLA belongs to the same party that rules in the
state, there is hardly any incentive to correct the failures of the ruling party.
However, it is not easy to verify the validity of the instruments, 𝑧1𝑖 and 𝑧2𝑖 , in terms of
exclusion restrictions even if the instruments are carefully selected, as discussed above.
Therefore, we also apply the Lewbel IV estimator which has been proposed as an alternative
method of estimating Equations (1)’ and (2) (Lewbel, 2012; Baum and Lewbel, 2019). The
12

In principle, trust in state governments in 2005 should be instrumented by margin of victory and whether the
MLA belonged to the ruling party in the state in 2005. As the results were counter-intuitive, we opted to
instrument trust in 2012 on the instruments in 2005. Note that 𝑦 𝑖 , ∆SWB, is the respondent’s perceived change
in subjective well-being in economic aspects between 2005-2012, based on the survey data in 2012. Hence 𝑦𝑖
reflects strongly the respondent’s perception in 2012 as well as the changes which occurred recently, rather than
the actual changes in the subjective well- being between 2005 and 2012. The perception in 2012 is found to be
more strongly influenced by 𝑇𝑖 , trust in state governments in 2012, than 𝑇𝑖 in 2005, and thus our use of 𝑇𝑖 in
2012 is justified.
.
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Lewbel IV draws upon the two-step estimation where (i) in the first step it estimates 𝛼0 , 𝛼1 ,
and 𝛼2 by OLS where 𝑇𝑖 , the trust variable, is regressed on the instruments, 𝑧1𝑖 , 𝑧2𝑖 , and 𝑋𝑖
and thus obtain the estimated residuals, 𝜀̂2𝑖 ; and (ii) in the second step it estimates 𝛽1 and 𝛽2
by 2SLS of 𝑦𝑖 (∆SBW) by 𝑋𝑖 and 𝑇𝑖 using external instruments, 𝑧1𝑖 , 𝑧2𝑖 as well as internally
generated instruments created by the estimation (i) or (𝑋𝑖 − 𝑋̅𝑖 )𝜀̂2𝑖 where 𝑋̅𝑖 is the sample
mean of 𝑋𝑖 (Baum and Lewbel, 2019). This procedure ensures that internally-created
instruments are uncorrelated with the product of heteroscedastic errors (Lewbel, 2012). We
use Lewbel IV as an attempt to strengthen the instruments and as a robustness check of 2SLS.
The result will be discussed in detail in the next section.
(b) Results
A list of variables and their descriptive statistics are given in Table 1. These are the variables
used in the econometric analyses.
Table 1
Summary Statistics
Variables
∆SWB
Whether a household head had trust in
the state government in 2012 (1 or 0)
Member Ruling Party
Margin of victory > 12%
Age
Age Square
Log per capita expenditure
Gender
Male
Female
Marital Status
Married
Unmarried
Widowed/Divorced
Sector
Rural
Urban
Urban Slum
Education
Illiterate
1-4
5-8
9-10

Mean
1.286

SD
0.634

Min
0

Max
2

0.302

0.094

0.121

0.481

0.241
0.428
46.0
2268
6.491

0.428
0.495
12.5
1220
0.666

0
0
16
256

1
1
97
9409

1.386

10.578

0.898
0.102

0.302
0.303

0
0

1
1

0.865
0.010
0.125

0.342
0.099
0.331

0
0
0

1
1
1

0.717
0.266
0.018

0.450
0.442
0.132

0
0
0

1
1
1

0.357
0.116
0.234
0.167

0.479
0.320
0.423
0.373

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
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>10
Religion
Hindu
Muslim
Christian
Others
Caste
Brahmin
High Caste
OBC
Dalit
Adivasi
Others
Log - Net State Domestic Product

0.125

0.331

0

1

0.831
0.108
0.025
0.036

0,374
0.310
0.156
0.186

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

0.049
0.152
0.366
0.222
0.082
0.130
9.983

0.215
0.359
0.481
0.416
0.275
0.336
0.430

0
0
0
0
0
0
8.976

1
1
1
1
1
1
11.065

Source: Computed by the authors from the IHDS.

(i)

2SLS

The reduced form 2SLS results of trust in state governments are displayed in the first column
of Table 2. As discussed earlier, we use two instruments: whether the winner in the state
election or MLA belonged to the ruling party and whether the margin of victory of the winner
over the closest loser exceeded 12 %. Both are statistically significant and negative, implying
that trust in state governments reduced when the winner belonged to the ruling party and the
margin of victory exceeded 12 %. As indicated earlier, if the ruling party underperformed, its
success in state elections would lower the citizens’ confidence. Besides, the greater the
margin of victory of the winning MLA (in excess of 12 %), the lower is the trust of the
citizens in state government. That is, if the winning legislators belonged to the ruling party,
the respondent (or the household head) is 13% less likely to trust the state government with
all the other covariates in the first-stage equation being unchanged. On the other hand, if the
margin of victory of the winner over the closest loser exceeded 12%, the household head is
5% less likely to trust the state government, all the other covariates unchanged. So the
magnitude of the change in the trust in response to these instrumental variables is nonnegligible.
The F-statistic is well above the Stock-Yogo critical value of 19.93 (shown at the bottom of
Table 2). This implies that the maximum relative bias of 2SLS estimates (compared with
OLS) is less than 10%, leading us to conclude that there is no weak instrument problem
(Stock and Yogo, 2005). However, the Hansen J statistic (Chi-square (1) = 30.39) is
significant which raises some doubt about the exclusion restrictions (see the bottom of Table
3). The basic idea of the J-statistic is that if both instruments are exogenous, then the two
21

2SLS estimators using the individual instruments are consistent and differ from each other
because of random sampling variation. If, however, one of the instruments is exogenous and
the other is not, the estimator based on the endogenous instrument is likely to be inconsistent,
as implied by a statistically significant J-statistic (Stock and Watson, 2018). So while the
instruments are strong, because of some concerns over the exclusion restrictions, we avoid
making any causal statement.13
Table 2
Correlates of Trust in the State Government (the First-Stage of 2SLS and Lewbel IV)
Dependent Variable: 𝑇𝑖 - Whether a household head had trust in the state government in 2012 (1 or 0)
2SLS
Lewbel IV
Explanatory Variables
Coeff
(s.e.)
Coeff
(s.e.)
Member Ruling Party
Margin of victory > 12%
Age
Age Square
Log per capita expenditure
Gender
Female
Marital Status
Unmarried
Widowed/Divorced
Sector
Urban
Urban Slum
Education
1-4
5-8
9-10
>10
Religion
Muslim
Christian
Others
Caste
Brahmin
High Caste
Dalit

-0.133***
-0.0496***
3.23e-05
1.23e-06
-0.00689***

(0.000929)
(0.00101)
(0.000196)
(2.00e-06)
(0.000704)

-0.13259***
-0.05696***
0.00015
5.00e-08**
-0.00396***

(0.00114)
(0.00103)
(0.00018)
(1.89e-06)
(0.00067)

0.00263

(0.00212)

0.002

(0.00204)

0.00698
0.00187

(0.00430)
(0.00198)

0.0053
0.00273

(0.00409)
(0.00190)

0.00509***
0.0206***

(0.000830)
(0.00316)

0.00414***
0.01737***

(0.00085)
(0.00254)

0.0135***
0.00810***
0.00704***
0.00950***

(0.00133)
(0.00112)
(0.00122)
(0.00136)

0.01269***
0.00862***
0.0092***
0.00925***

(0.00122)
(0.00102)
(0.00120)
(0.00136)

-0.0519***
0.0123***
-0.00807***

(0.00343)
(0.00296)
(0.00291)

-0.05114***
0.01548***
-0.01672***

(0.00427)
(0.00338)
(0.00308)

-0.00879***
-0.0141***
-0.00716***

(0.00190)
(0.00112)
(0.00104)

-0.01145***
-0.01476***
-0.00711***

(0.00175)
(0.00117)
(0.00093)

13

It should be noted, however, that Hansen (2021) is cautious and suggests that the Hansen J test should not be
used as a definitive test for validating or invalidating the IV model given the ambiguous nature of the test. He
notes that ‘…it seems reasonable to require strong evidence to lead to the conclusion “Let’s reject this model”.
The recommendation is that mild rejections (p-values between 1% and 5%) should be viewed as mildly
worrisome but not critical evidence against a model. The results of an over-identification test should be
integrated with other information before making a strong decision.’ (Hansen, 2021, p. 378, emphasis added by
the authors). Therefore, given that the instruments are strong, despite the result of the Hansen J test, our 2SLS
and Lewbel results should have empirical significance, while the available data would not allow us to find a case
where the Hansen J statistic is statistically non-significant. The results of OLS are broadly similar to those of
2SLS or Lewbel models, but we present only the results of the 2SLS and Lewbel IV models since the first-stage
results are meaningful. The results of OLS will be provided on request.
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Adivasi
Others
Log - Net State Domestic Product
Constant
Observations
F test of excluded instruments
Stock and Yogo’s (2005) critical value

-0.00365
0.0333***
-0.0511***
0.904

(0.00224)
(0.00335)
(0.000947)
(0.0109)

-0.00251
0.03169***
-0.05017***
0.87799

(0.00184)
(0.00419)
(0.00103)
(0.01140)

29,543
29,543
F( 2, 29519) = 10351.26*** F( 23, 29498) = 1218.60***
Prob > F = 0.0000
Prob > F = 0.0000
10% maximal IV size 19.93
10% maximal IV size 11.41

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses . *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Let us first consider the demographic variables. Neither age nor its square are significant; nor
are gender and marital status14. However, location - living in urban areas (net of slums) and
slums - display higher confidence/trust in state governments, relative to rural households. If a
household is located in urban areas (urban slums), the household head is 0.5% (2.1%) more
likely to trust the state government than those in rural areas. These results are plausible as
their perception of confidence/trust in state governments is likely to be shaped by their easier
access to social safety nets (e.g., mid-day meal scheme for school children, pensions, PDS),
and local public goods such as public schooling and health care.
Schooling is a form of human capital with not just more remunerative employment options
but also with positive externalities of a better informed and more responsible citizenry. It is
found that, relative to no schooling, each category/grade of schooling has a similar magnitude
of a positive association with trust in the state government with some degree of non-linearity
found as the level/grade of schooling increases. The household head without any schooling
which serves as a default/comparison category is least likely to trust the state government
since all the coefficient estimates of four education grades show positive and significant
coefficient estimates. Interestingly, the household head with only 1-4 years of schooling at
the primary level is most likely (i.e., 1.4% more likely than those without any schooling) to
trust the state government. This is followed by those with highest schooling (10 years or
more) who are 1.0% more likely to trust the state government than those without schooling,
those with 5-8 years of schooling (+0.8%) and those with 9-10 years of schooling (+0.7%) all compared with those without schooling. This implies that schooling is associated with
moderate trust in the state government. However, the absolute magnitudes of the differences
across different education groups are relatively small.

14

As age and its square may be collinear, their standard errors are likely to be imprecise. Hence their nonsignificance should not be taken at face value.
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Religion is also associated with significant differences in trust in the state government.
Predictably, despite a more secular UPA regime (compared with the subsequent NDA regime
with a strong positive bias for Hindus), Muslims on average are least likely to trust the state
government among all the religion groups, 5.2% less likely to have confidence in the state
government than the omitted group of Hindus, all the other covariates being unchanged. On
the other hand, another minority group of Christians on average is most likely to trust the
state government among all the religion groups, 1.2% more likely than Hindus, (i.e., 6.4%
(5.2% plus 1.2%) more likely than Muslims), to trust the state government. ‘Others’ displays
a negative coefficient estimate, that is, they are 0.8% less likely to trust the state government
than Hindus. However, their confidence level is not much different from the Hindus’ (in
terms of the absolute magnitude of coefficient estimates) and 4.4% (5.2% minus 0.8%) higher
than Muslims who are least likely to trust the government.
Caste hierarchy persists and the economic and social mainstreaming of lower castes is elusive
despite affirmative action and their upward economic mobility. However, the pattern of
associations is intriguing, relative to the omitted group of OBCs. Both upper castes and lower
castes display negative associations while the residual group of ‘Others’ shows a positive
association with trust in the state government. That is, the household head in ‘Others’ is most
likely to trust the state government, 3.3% more likely to have confidence than OBCs. This is
followed by Adivasis (0.4% less likely than OBCs to trust the state government – though
statistically a non-significant coefficient estimate), Dalit (0.7% less likely to trust the state
government than OBCs), Brahmins (-0.9%), and High Caste (-1.4%), which is least likely to
trust the state government. It seems plausible that while upper castes resent affirmative action
for SCs/STs, even if their catch up is slow but consistent. On the other hand, lower castes
resent their limited access to social safety nets and being on the fringe of the social and
economic mainstream. As ‘Others’ are akin to upper castes, and if the gap between their
aspirations and achievements narrows due to progressive state policies (e.g., through better
provision of public goods and services such as public schooling and healthcare), they are
likely to repose greater trust in state government. However, we avoid making strong
inferences as the absolute magnitudes of differences are relatively small.
Let us now consider two measures of economic affluence: per capita expenditure and state
domestic product per capita (both in logs). Both more affluent households and states show
statistically significant negative associations with trust in state governments. If affluent
households bear the brunt of taxation and a large share of the revenue finances social safety
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nets and weak law enforcement agencies, this may in part plausibly explain the lower trust of
the more affluent. If the per capita household expenditure increases by 1%, the household
head is 0.7% less likely to trust the state government. Besides, if more affluent states tend to
underperform in the provision of public goods (e.g., poor quality of public health
infrastructure and of schooling), this is likely to be a plausible basis for lower trust in state
governments. A 1% increase in the net state domestic product is associated with a 5.1%
decrease in the probability of the respondent trusting the government.
Let us now turn to column 1 of Table 3 for covariates of the household head’s perceived
change in subjective well-being in the economic aspect (∆SWB), the second stage results of
2SLS. We focus especially on how ∆SWB is associated with trust in the state government
predicted in the first stage of the 2SLS model (𝑇̂). We find that there is a statistically significant
and positive association between trust in the state government and ∆SWB. This implies that,
if the household head has confidence in the state government, he or she is 22.6% more likely
to perceive a positive change in subjective well-being in economic aspects in 2005-12 (i.e.,
moving one step up the ladder of ∆SWB defined earlier). As discussed earlier, while we have
attempted to take into account the endogeneity of 𝑇̂, we will not draw any causal inference
given that the Hansen J test statistic is statistically significant.
Table 3
Correlates of ∆SWB (the Second-Stage Results of 2SLS and Lewbel IV)
Dependent Variable: ∆SWB or Change in Subjective Well-Being

2SLS
Explanatory Variables
̂ (Predicted trust in the state
𝑻
government in the first stage)
Age
Age Square
Log per capita expenditure
Gender
Female
Marital Status
Unmarried
Widowed/Divorced
Sector
Urban
Urban Slum
Education
1-4
5-8
9-10
>10
Religion

Lewbel IV
Coeff
SE

Coeff

SE

0.226**

(0.0988)

0.231**

(0.0939)

0.00670***
-7.80e-05***
0.0736***

(0.00243)
(2.50e-05)
(0.00925)

0.00670***
-7.80e-05***
0.0737***

(0.00243)
(2.50e-05)
(0.00925)

-0.00496

(0.0290)

-0.00493

(0.0290)

-0.0632
-0.0271

(0.0496)
(0.0267)

-0.0633
-0.0272

(0.0496)
(0.0267)

0.0643***
-0.0238

(0.0109)
(0.0302)

0.0643***
-0.0238

(0.0109)
(0.0302)

0.0549***
0.0953***
0.168***
0.182***

(0.0181)
(0.0142)
(0.0168)
(0.0186)

0.0548***
0.0953***
0.167***
0.182***

(0.0181)
(0.0142)
(0.0168)
(0.0186)
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Muslim
Christian
Others
Caste
Brahmin
High Caste
Dalit
Adivasi
Others
Log - Net State Domestic Product
Constant
Observations
Hansen J statistic (over-identification
test of all instruments)

:

0.0774**
0.122***
0.119***

(0.0384)
(0.0330)
(0.0292)

0.0776**
0.122***
0.119***

(0.0386)
(0.0330)
(0.0292)

-0.000681
-0.000686
-0.0726***
0.0388*
-0.0943**
0.101***
-0.479

(0.0223)
(0.0151)
(0.0148)
(0.0208)
(0.0368)
(0.0186)
(0.217)

-0.000633
-0.000587
-0.0726***
0.0388*
-0.0943**
0.101***
-0.485

(0.0223)
(0.0151)
(0.0148)
(0.0208)
(0.0368)
(0.0185)
(0.215)

29,543
30.388

Chi-sq(1) P-val = 0.0000
Robust standard errors in parentheses

29,543
99.504
Chi-sq(22) P-val = 0.0020

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Turning to the demographic variables, we find that both age and age squared are significantly
associated with ∆SWB. While the change in subjective well-being is positively associated
with age, it is negatively associated with age squared. However, the coefficient is negligible.
These findings suggest that ∆SWB rises with age but with negligible diminution at an older
age. Neither gender nor marital status show significant associations with change in wellbeing. Location yields significant associations in so far as urban residents display greater
well-being, relative to rural residents. This is not surprising as public amenities (e.g.,
transport, hygiene and sanitation, safe drinking water, public schooling and health care) are
much better in urban areas but pollution levels are higher.
As far as schooling grades are concerned, we observe a significant monotonic rising
association with ∆SWB. In fact, the marginal effect/association at the primary level (1-4
years) rises from 0.055 to 0.182 at above matriculation level, relative to no schooling. The
magnitude is substantial given our measure of change in SWB. The results imply, for
instance, that, if the household head schooled at/ above matriculation level (1-4 years of
schooling), he or she is 18.2% (5.5%) more likely to perceive a better change in the
household well-being, compared with those without any schooling. That there is a threshold
effect of level of schooling in the labour market and a concern for social betterment is not
unlikely, but could not be ascertained here.
As our measure is confined to the subjective perception of change in economic well-being, it
is not surprising that per capita expenditure is positively associated with well-being. A 1 %
higher per capita expenditure is associated with a 7.4 % higher probability of moving up the
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subjective well-being ladder. This is expected as the focus of our measure is on change in
economic well-being. So affluence translates itself into substantially higher well-being. State
affluence too is associated with a substantially higher increase in the probability of moving
up the ladder of well-being. If state affluence is inclusive and associated with more rewarding
employment opportunities, better schooling for children and health care for the residents, it is
plausible that the probability of moving up the well-being ladder rises by 10 % in response to
a 1 % higher state domestic product per capita.
(ii)

Lewbel IV

The Lewbel IV model, in addition to the two external instruments for 2SLS, utilises internally
generated instruments based on heteroscedasticity in the error term.15 The results are given in
column 3 of Tables 2 and 3.
It is interesting that there is a statistically significant and negative relationship between trust
in the state government and the two external instruments: whether the winning MLA
belonged to the ruling party and whether the margin of victory exceeded 12 %. The
coefficients are similar to those obtained with 2SLS as shown in the first two rows of Table 2.
There are 22 internally specified variables used in the first stage of the Lewbel IV not
presented in Table 216 and many of these variables are statistically significant in the first
stage of the Lewbel IV. The F-statistic (1218.60) is well above the Stock-Yogo critical value
of 11.41, implying that the instruments are jointly strong (see the bottom of Table 2). This
implies that the maximum relative bias of the Lewbel estimates (compared with OLS) is less
than 10%, leading us to conclude that there is no weak instrument problem (Stock and Yogo,
2005). However, the Hansen J statistic (Chi-square (22) = 99.50) is statistically significant as
shown at the bottom of Table 3. This casts some doubt about the exogeneity of the
instruments as discussed earlier and we will avoid making causal inferences.
Because most of the other covariates in the first stage of Lewbel IV show the same pattern of
the estimates as in 2SLS in Table 2, we mainly highlight a few differences. Among the
demographic variables, compared with the 2SLS results in which neither age nor its square
was significant, the latter is significant with a negligible value. As in the 2SLS results, neither

15

We have estimated the Lewbel model only with the internally-generated instruments, but have not found a
statistically significant coefficient estimate of trust in state governments in the second stage, although the
instruments are statistically significant in the first stage. The results will be provided on request.
16
These variables are computed as (𝑋𝑖 − 𝑋̅𝑖 )𝜀̂2𝑖 where 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of exogenous variables, 𝑋̅𝑖 is the mean of
𝑋𝑖 , 𝜀̂2𝑖 is a vector of the estimated error terms based on Equation (2).
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gender nor marital status is significant. Location, however, is associated with significant
differences in confidence/trust in state governments. Relative to rural households, those
living in urban areas (net of slums) and slums display higher trust in state governments. The
coefficients are similar to those obtained with 2SLS. Schooling grades show significant
positive associations with trust in state governments. Again, schooling grades are positively
associated with the probability of the household head trusting the state government, with nonlinearity as the schooling grades rise. Those with minimal schooling (1-4 years) are most
likely to trust the state government (i.e., 1.3% more likely than those without schooling as a
reference group). The probability of trusting the state government increases marginally as
schooling grades rise (+0.86% for 5-8 years, +0.92% for 9-10 years, and +0.925% for >10
years in terms of the probability of trusting the state government in comparison with those
without schooling). The differences are, however, small.
Among the socio-economic variables, religion and caste are salient. The results are largely
similar to those obtained with the 2SLS except that the coefficient of ‘Others’ is larger. As
before, Muslims display a negative association while Christians show a positive association
with trust in state governments. Not only the signs but also the absolute magnitudes are
similar to those in 2SLS.
The caste-wise results are mostly similar to those obtained with the 2SLS. An important point
to note is that both upper castes and Dalits/SCs show significant negative associations while
‘Others’ is most likely to trust the state government as it is the only group showing a positive
association with trust/confidence in state governments where the reference group is OBCs.
One difference is that the coefficient on Brahmins is slightly larger than in the 2SLS (in
absolute value). If the household head belongs to Brahmins, he or she is 1.1% less likely to
trust the state government than those in OBCs. As before, we found that the household head
in High Castes shows the largest negative coefficient estimate (-1.5%), implying that he or
she is least likely to trust the state government. However, the absolute magnitudes of
coefficient estimates are relatively small and we avoid making strong inferences.
As in the 2SLS, both measures of affluence- at the household and state levels- show
significant negative associations with trust in state governments. A 1 % increase in per capita
expenditure is associated with a 0.4 % reduction in the probability of trust in state
government (lower than in the 2SLS in absolute value). However, a 1% increase in state
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domestic product per capita is associated with a much larger reduction in the probability of
trust in state governments (5 % which is identical to that of the 2SLS).
Let us now turn to the relationship between ∆SWB and (predicted) trust in state government
and other covariates (column 3 of Table 3). There is a statistically significant and positive
relationship between these two variables, and the coefficient on trust is similar to that
obtained from the 2SLS. A unit increase in the (predicted) trust in state governments (𝑇̂) is
associated with an increase in the probability of moving up the ladder of well-being by
23.1%. This indicates a substantial increase in the probability of perceiving a positive change
in well-being in economic aspects.
On the results of demographic explanatory variables, while age is positively related to change
in well-being, the coefficient on age squared while significant is negligible. These are almost
identical to the 2SLS coefficients. An inference, therefore, is that change in well-being rises
with age but the diminution at old age is negligible. Neither gender nor marital status possess
significant coefficients.
As before, location shows a significant association. Relative to rural residents, urban
residents display a higher perceived change in their well-being. The coefficients are identical
in both estimations. Schooling grades are positively associated with change in subjective
well-being. The monotonic rise in the coefficient estimates on schooling grades replicates the
2SLS pattern with almost identical signs and absolute values. Hence, the inference drawn for
2SLS earlier is valid here.
Among socio-economic variables, we consider religion and caste. It is indeed striking that,
relative to Hindus, all religions display higher well-being. This is particularly surprising in
the case of Muslims who bear the brunt of discrimination and hostility from the hard-core
Hindus. What is also notable is the replication of 2SLS results and so our previous
interpretation of the signs and magnitudes of marginal effects of coefficient estimates is valid
here.
As far as castes are concerned, there is a notable difference between lower castes: while
Dalits/SCs manifest a negative association, Adivasis/STs show a positive association with
change in subjective well-being. Another notable contrast is that ‘Others’ who are akin to
upper castes show a significant negative association. This is somewhat intriguing unless they
resent not being able to catch up with upper castes economically and in relation to their own
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aspirations. Notably, these results replicate the 2SLS results and we avoid repeating the
coefficient estimates here.
Affluence at the household level increases the probability of moving up the ladder of wellbeing – a 1 % increase in per capita expenditure is associated with a 7.4 % increase in the
probability of moving up. Affluence at the state level is also associated with a substantial
increase in the probability of moving up the ladder- a 1 % increase in state domestic product
per capita is associated with a more than 10 % higher probability of moving up. Notably, the
2SLS results are replicated with almost identical coefficients.
In sum, the fact that, in most cases, the 2SLS and Lewbel results are similar, if not identical,
suggests that our analyses are robust to the choice of different specifications. However, the
fact that in both specifications, the exogeneity condition failed does not allow us to draw
causal inferences. Another limitation of our analysis is that, since the explanatory variables
relate to 2005 and the outcomes to 2012, we are unable to incorporate fixed/random effects.
These could change the results as our dependent variable, change in subjective well-being, is
likely to be influenced by how an individual adapts his/her aspirations to a given context and
peers. An ambitious individual, for example, would be more resentful and frustrated if a
member of the peer group accomplishes greater professional success.
6. Discussion
Instead of summarising the main findings, we will discuss selected findings from a broad
policy perspective.
Here an attempt is made to focus on policy implications of our results, which sets the stage
for prospects of policy reforms in the following Section. Even though the econometric
analysis overlaps with a phase of the previous UPA regime, the policy implications are more
relevant in the current NDA regime which has robbed states of their autonomy through
excess centralisation and an inflexible and violent form of Hindu nationalism, Hindutva, that
has destroyed social and religious harmony. Hence, brief comments on the policy flavour of
our findings are appropriate. In doing so, however, we stick closely to our findings.
Let us first consider the insights from the first stage regressions of trust in state governments.
The relevance of the instruments in state elections-whether winning candidates belonged to
the ruling party and high margins of victory-are indicative of the dominance of a few national
and regional parties and rising levels of corruption and criminality among them (Kulkarni et
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al. 2022). A competitive and transparent party system at the state level may help weed out
corruption and criminality in state assembly elections.
Trust in state government is higher in urban areas and slums, relative to rural areas,
presumably because of a continuing urban bias in the provision of public goods and services.
Not just the reallocation of public funding to rural areas but also larger amounts for rural
development will moderate rural-urban migration and prevent further congestion and
overcrowding with an improvement in access to better public amenities. This is not to suggest
that urban renewal is unimportant. Quite the contrary. Much needs to be done to decrease
congestion, improve public health provision, relocation of households trapped in sub-human
conditions, and reduce pollution. Thus, urban development remains a daunting challenge in
itself.
We have observed a positive association between schooling grades and trust in state
governments with some non-linearity. Despite better awareness of state government policy
failures, those with more schooling show higher levels of confidence. This evidence suggests
that the belief in state governments’ capacity for social and economic transformation more
than offsets the scepticism born of policy failures. However, it is imperative to not just
expand school education - especially in rural areas - but also improve its quality.
That there is a trust deficit among Muslims, relative to Hindus, is a stark reminder of the
discrimination that they face in social and economic spheres despite UPA’s secular
credentials. Indeed, the persistence of hostility betrays deep-seated prejudices against
Muslims that government policies find difficult to remove. Others-a residual group of
religious sects- is more neglected than discriminated against while Christians are better
protected against Hindu prejudices. How attitudes and behaviour could be moulded for
religious harmony is bound to be a slow and uncertain process.
Except for Others, relative to OBCs, we find that both upper and lower castes (Dalits) display
negative associations with trust/confidence in state governments. While upper castes resent
catching up of Dalits through affirmative action, the latter resent their failure to mainstream.
Hence their associations with trust in state governments seem mutually reinforcing. While
aspirations are tied to preferences and are contextual, more inclusive growth could impart a
greater sense of accomplishment among diverse castes-especially lower castes.
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Finally, the negative associations of affluence at both household and state levels are
intriguing. There could be more than one explanation. But the one offered earlier bears
repeating. If the affluent bear a greater burden of taxation and the revenue is used for
ineffective safety nets (eg, corruption in the mid-day meal scheme and in NREGA/renamed
later as MGNREGA) and in law enforcement agencies, these could be grounds for lower trust
in state governments. Besides, if the more affluent states underperform in the implementation
of social safety nets and in maintaining the rule of law, lower trust outcomes are not unlikely.
Whether better monitoring and prompt remedial action would make a difference is plausible.
Let us now review our findings on the covariates of changes in subjective well-being. A key
association is between this measure of well-being and (predicted) trust in state governments.
Both specifications establish a statistically significant and positive relationship between them.
During the UPA regime, trust in state governments was low but rose between 2005 and 2012.
Hence the case for building trust in state governments is vital for the associated increase in
the probability of greater well-being.
Urban development is a priority in ensuring greater well-being. However, as noted earlier,
both rural and urban development have to go together since the betterment of rural areas has
strong spillover effects on urban development through reduction of (uncontrolled) rural-urban
migration in search of more rewarding employment opportunities and concomitant
congestion and pollution.
Schooling grades show robust positive associations with changes in subjective well-being.
The higher the grades of schooling, the stronger is the association. Schooling reforms require
not just corrections in teacher absenteeism, high school drop-out rates, and poor vocational
skills, among others, but also substantial upgrading of school infrastructure (eg, easy access
to computers, adequate class-room facilities, separate toilets for girls).
What is indeed heartening is that despite discrimination against minorities-especially
Muslims-they are associated with higher probabilities of well-being, relative to Hindus. That
this reflects their perceived security under the UPA is more than likely. Religious harmony
has, however, been largely destroyed under the NDA by the relentless pursuit of Hindutva
and over-centralisation with state governments toeing the Union government diktat. Worse,
there is collusion between state governments, lower judiciary, and local police in carrying out
these agendas. Whether religious harmony is irretrievably destroyed is of course debatable.
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The caste associations are mixed with a striking contrast between Dalits and Adivasis-the
former display a strong negative association while the latter record a positive association with
change in subjective well-being. As these are the lowest rungs in the caste hierarchy, the
contrast is presumably a manifestation of the Dalits’ failure to mainstream and the latter’s
spatial and social isolation. Others are a residual group that is akin to upper castes but not
quite in their accomplishments. Hence their negative association with change in well-being is
not surprising.
7. Concluding Observations
As emphasised earlier, although our analysis is confined to a phase of the UPA regime, it has
strong policy implications for the present NDA regime during which there has been excessive
centralisation and a relentless pursuit of Hindutva in which BJP –ruled state governments
have been a willing ally17. The state governments, lower judiciary and the police have been
not just silent observers but have been instrumental in crimes against minorities –especially
Muslims and lower caste Hindus. Hence it is highly probable that there has been substantial
erosion of trust in these public institutions-especially the state governments. So in order to
assess the relevance and feasibility of addressing policy concerns, it is necessary to highlight
the constraints and impediments to policy reforms that would enable large segments of the
Indian population to live dignified and fulfilling lives.
What has further contributed to the erosion of trust in these institutions is their frequent use of
security, defamation, sedition, and hate speech laws, as well as contempt-of-court charges to
muzzle the media. Contrariwise, revelations of collusion between politicians, business
magnates, and lobbyists, on one hand, and leading media personalities and owners of media
outlets, as a survival strategy, on the other, have undermined public confidence in the press
(Freedom House, 2021).
Secularism was dealt a body blow by the Constitutional Amendment Act (CAA), together
with the proposed National Register of Citizens (NRC), as it risks disenfranchising Muslims
17

Aiyyar and Tillin (2020) have drawn attention to the heavy reliance on constitutional authorities such as
governors to impose New Delhi’s diktat and encroach on state autonomy. The number of states in which the BJP
rules or shares power rose from 8 in 2014 to 20 in four years of Prime Minister Modi’s leadership to emerge as
the strongest force in the country. However, in 2016, obliging governors of the states of Uttarakhand and
Arunachal Pradesh – which were ruled by parties that were in opposition at the Centre – reported that the
constitutional machinery in these states had broken down, leading to the federal government dismissing the state
governments and assuming direct rule. In both cases, the Supreme Court intervened to restore the dismissed
governments (Khaitan 2020).
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across the country. It provides a pathway to citizenship for non-Muslims but has no remedies
for Muslims caught up in NRC processes. There were violent clashes between the protesters
and the police. In February 2020, more than 50 people were killed in Delhi; there were
reports of indiscriminate attacks against Muslims and police officers failing to respond, as
well as some attacks against the police and Hindu residents18.
The Constitution guarantees all individuals with equal rights, but unfortunately. a vast
majority of our citizens are not able to enjoy the rights effectively due to a lack of ability to
enforce them. From the citizen’s perspective, the enforcement of legal rights is done through
the judicial processes, but the court procedures are very complex, costly and tardy, putting
the poor people at an extreme disadvantage (Ghosh, 2017, Apoorvanand, 2021, Kulkarni et
al. 2022b)19
Restoration of trust in public institutions is daunting-specifically when it is systemic. As our
discussion shows, extreme centralisation of power in the Centre and blatant violation of
democratic values have had disastrous consequences in terms of violent clashes, loss of lives,
religious discord, assaults on academic freedom, suppression and manipulation of mass
media. Exercise of extra-constitutional authority by the Central and state governments,
weakening of accountability mechanisms, widespread corruption in the lower judiciary and
the police, with likely collusion between them, the perverted beliefs of the latter towards
Muslims, other minorities and lower-caste Hindus, a proclivity to deliver instant justice,
extra-judicial killings, filing FIRs against innocent victims of mob lynching - specifically,
Muslim cattle traders -while the perpetrators of violence are allowed to get away have left
scars on the national psyche that may take years to heal. More competitive Central and state
governments with strong and credible opposition are key to the restoration of a more
democratic environment and for trust to grow. Whether elections can deliver these results is
anybody’s guess. Freedom of the press or, more broadly, of the mass media has a potentially
important role. But whether these can be unshackled from the clutches of an oppressive
regime seems unlikely.

18

The Uttar Pradesh police has arrested over 1,200 people and detained at least 5,500 people in connection with
the NRC-CAA related violence (Firstpost 15 March 2020, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/anti-caaviolence-with-more-arrests-number-people-apprehended-muzaffarnagar-reaches-85-1635554-2020-01-10,
accessed on 30 April 2022).
19
In 2018, as the “love jihad” rhetoric became part of the mainstream political discourse, the National
Investigation Agency (NIA) conducted an inquiry into interfaith marriages in Kerala. The investigation, as
expected, found no evidence of coercion in any of the cases examined. A similar investigation that was
conducted in September 2020 in Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh, reached the same conclusion (Apoorvanand 2021)
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In conclusion, the prospects of reforms in the functioning of state governments are daunting
when they are at the mercy of a highly centralised Union government which tramples
individual rights and freedom of speech with impunity. A competitive federal structure that
serves the people better is highly desirable but in the present context highly unlikely.

35

References
Aiyyar, Y. and L. Tillin (2020): “One Nation BJP and the Future of Federalism”, India
Review, Vol 19, No 2, pp 117-135.
Akay, A. O. B. Bargain, and H. X. Jara (2017) “Back to Bentham, Should We? Large-Scale
Comparison of Experienced versus Decision Utility”, IZA DP No. 10907, Bonn.
Angrist, J. D., and J. S. Pischke (2008).Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist's
companion. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Apoorvanand. (2021): “India's 'love jihad' laws: Another attempt to subjugate Muslims”.
January 15. AL Jazeera.
Bauer, P. and M .Fretag (2017) “Measuring Trust”, Ed. E. M. Uslaner,The Oxford Handbook
of Social and Political Trust, New York and Oxford.
Baum, C.F. and A. Lewbel (2019) “Advice on using heteroscedasticity-based identification”,
The Stata Journal: Promoting communications on statistics and Stata, December
18,https://doi.org/10.1177/1536867X19893614
Blanchflower, D. G., and Oswald, A. J. (2004). “Well-being over time in Britain and the
USA”.Journal of Public Economics, 88, 1359–1386.
Blanchflower, D.G., and A. Oswald (2007) “Is Well-Being U-Shaped Over The Life Cycle?”,
NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 12935, Cambridge, MA.
Brillantes, A.B. and M.T.F.T. Fernandez (2011) “Restoring Trust and Building Integrity in
Government: Issues and Concerns in the Philippines and Areas for Reform”. International
Public Management Review, 12, 55-80.
Clark, A. (2003). “Unemployment as a social norm: Psychological evidence from panel
data”. Journal of Labor Economics, 21(2), 323–351.
Clark, A., Frijters, P., and Shields, M. A. (2008).“A survey of the income happiness
gradient”.Journal of Economic Literature.
Cantril, H (1965). The pattern of human concerns. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University
Press.
Chemin, M. (2010) “Does Court Speed Shape Economic Activity? Evidence from a Court
Reform in India”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Advance Access published
November 11
Dalton, R.J. (2005), “The social transformation of Trust in Government”, International
Review of Sociology
Deaton, A. (2011) “Aging, Religion, and Health”, D. A. Wise (ed.) Explorations in the
Economics of Aging, University of Chicago Press.
Deaton, A. (2018) “What do self-reports of well-being say about life-cycle theory and
policy?”,Journal of Public Economics, 162, 18-25.
Deshpande, R., K.K. Kailash & L. Tillin (2017): “States as laboratories: The politics of social
welfare policies in India”, India Review, Vol 16, 2017.
36

Diener, E. R. Inglehart, L. T. (2013)“Theory and Validity of Life Satisfaction Scales”, Soc
Indic Res, 112:497–527.
Dolan, P., T. Peasgood, and M. White (2008) “Do we really know what makes us happy? A
review of the economic literature on the factors associated with subjective well-being”.
Journal of Economic Psychology 29, 94–122.
Duesenberry, J.S. (1949) Income, Saving, and the Theory of Consumer Behavior. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge.
Easterlin, R. A. (1973). “Does Money Buy Happiness?” The Public Interest; New York Vol. 30,

Easterlin, R. A. (2006). “Life cycle happiness and its sources: Intersections of psychology,
economics, and demography”, Journal of Economic Psychology, 27(4), 463-482.
Gissur Ó. Erlingsson, J. Linde & R. Öhrvall (2014) “Not so Fair after All? Perceptions of
Procedural Fairness and Satisfaction with Democracy in the Nordic Welfare States”,
International
Journal
of
Public
Administration, 37:2, 106119, DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2013.836667.
Fehr, E. (2009). “On the economics and biology of trust”, .Journal of the European
Economic Association, 7(2-3), 235-266.
Fontaine, X. & K. Yamada (2014) “Caste Comparisons in India: Evidence From Subjective
Well-Being Data”, World Development, vol. 64, issue C, 407-419.
Freedom House (2021) Freedom in the World 2021: Democracy under Siege.
Ghosh, Y. (2017): “Indian Judiciary: An Analysis of the Cyclic Syndrome of Delay, Arrears
and Pendency”. Asian Journal of Legal Education, Vol5, No 1, pp 21-39.
Governor, Uttar Pradesh (2020): The Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious
Conversion Ordinance. Lucknow: UP Ordinance No. 21 of 2020.
Hansen,
B.E.,
2021.
Econometrics.
Revised
https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~bhansen/econometrics/ (accessed on 28 April 2022).

version:

Hardin, R. (2000) Trust and Trustworthiness, Russell Sage Foundation, New York.
Kahneman, D., and A. B. Krueger (2006) “Developments in the Measurement of Subjective
Well-Being”, Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 20, Number 1—Winter—3-2.
Kahneman, D., and A. Deaton (2010) “High income improves evaluation of life but not
emotional well-being”, PNAS, September 21, vol. 107, no. , pp. 16489–16493.
Khaitan, T. (2020): “Killing a Constitution with a Thousand Cuts: Executive Aggrandizement
and Party-state Fusion in India”.Law & Ethics of Human Rights,Vol 14, No 1, 49-95.
Kulkarni, Vani, S. Veena S. Kulkarni, K. Imai, and R. Gaiha. (2021). "Changes in Subjective
versus Objective Well-Being in India." University of Pennsylvania Population Centre
Working Paper PSC/PARC), 2021-71. https://repository.upenn.edu/psc_publications/71.
Kulkarni, Vani,S., Veena S. Kulkarni, K. Imai, and R.Gaiha. (2022a) "Change in Subjective
Well-Being, Affluence and Trust in Politicians." University of Pennsylvania Population
37

Center
Working
Paper
87. https://repository.upenn.edu/psc_publications/87.

(PSC/PARC),

2022-

Kulkarni, Vani, S., Veena S. Kulkarni, K. Imai, and R.Gaiha. (2022b) “ Change in Subjective
Well-Being, Affluence and Trust in Judiciary”, University of Pennsylvania Population
Center
Working
Paper
(PSC/PARC),
202290. https://repository.upenn.edu/psc_publications/90.
Kumar, D., Pratap, B., & A.Agarwal, (2020) “Public trust in state governments in India: Who
are more confident and what makes them confident about the government?”, Asian Journal of
Comparative Politics.
Levi, M. (1997) Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism, Cambridge University Press.
Lewbel, A. (2012)“Using Heteroscedasticity to Identify and Estimate Mismeasured and
Endogenous Regressor Models”, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics Volume
30, Issue 1.
Marien, S., & M., Hooghe (2011) “Does political trust matter? An empirical investigation
into the relation between political trust and support for law compliance”, European Journal
of Political Research, Volume50, Issue2.
Muller, E., & Thomas Jukam. 1977. “On the Meaning of Political Support”, 71: 1561-95.
NCAER & University of Maryland (2015) India Human Development Survey,
https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR22626.v12 and https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR36151.v6.
Ravallion, M. (2014) “Poor, or Just Feeling Poor? On Using Subjective Data in Measuring
Poverty”, In Happiness and Economic Growth, A. Clark and C. Senik (eds,) Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Ravallion, M., K. Himelein and K. Beegle (2016) “Can Subjective Questions on Economic
Welfare Be Trusted?”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, volume 64, no. 4.
Stock, J. H. & M.W. Watson (2018) Introduction to Econometrics, Pearson.
Stock, J. H. and M. Yogo (2005):“Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression,” in
Identification and Inference for Econometric Models: A Festschrift in Honour of Thomas J.
Rothenberg, D. W. K. Andrews and J. H. Stock (eds.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.

38

